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CRIMINAL LAW-INFANTS: MINOR'S WAIVER
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RIGHTS CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZED
BY NORTH DAKOTA'S COURTS
On the afternoon of November 25, 1987, fifteen-year-old
Brandon Ellvanger inspected his trap lines on the farm where he
lived with his father, Gregory Ellvanger.' At approximately 9:00
p.m. that evening, Brandon visited with his grandfather at a res-
taurant in Stanley, North Dakota.2 After a one-half hour conversa-
tion, Brandon left to check on his traps again.3  Instead of
checking his traps, however, Brandon met two friends with whom
he drove around town and drank beer.' Later, the three of them
went to a party, where Brandon consumed more alcohol.- The
next thing Brandon remembered was feeling a pain in his back
and being awakened by his father, Gregory Ellvanger.6
Gregory Ellvanger returned home from a truck-driving trip
early in the morning of November 26 and found Brandon's
friends, whom he didn't recognize, sleeping in the car.7 He went
into the house, woke Brandon, and told him to go oitside.8 Greg-
ory then went back outside and woke the driver of the car, James
Kyllonen, with whom he began to argue.9 While Gregory and
James were arguing, Brandon came out with a rifle slung over his
shoulder.' ° Gregory approached Brandon and yelled at him; in
response, Brandon talked about his traps." James also approached
Brandon. 2 At that point, Brandon's father had stopped approxi-
mately five feet from Brandon with his back turned.'3 Gregory
then heard a scuffle behind him and some gunshots. 14 Gregory
turned and ran toward Brandon to disarm him.' 5 In the course of
the struggles, James Kyllonen was killed and Gregory was
1. State v. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d 810, 811 (N.D. 1990).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 812. The two friends Brandon met were James Kyllonen and John McGinnity.
Id.
5. Id. Brandon did not remember leaving the party. Id.
6. Id. Gregory struck Brandon on the back in an attempt to wake him. Id.
7. ElIvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 812. Gregory unsuccessfully tried to wake the person in
the driver's seat. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The rifle was a .22 semi-automatic. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 812.
14. Id. Because Gregory had his back turned, he did not see what had happened. Id.
15. ld.
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wounded.16
A jury convicted Brandon of both manslaughter and
attempted manslaughter. 17  Brandon appealed the convictions,
arguing that his admission of shooting the gun, which was obtained
through police questioning following the incident, should have
been inadmissible because it was obtained involuntarily.18 He also
argued that there were two other prejudicial errors by the trial
court: the trial court's reading of the charging information, and a
statement made by the judge that he would "'end up sentencing
him.' "" On review, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
the the admissions made by Brandon were involuntary and that
the reading of the charging information by the trial court was
harmless error.20 State v. Elivanger, 453 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1990).
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court decided Miranda v.
Arizona,2 ' which established the standards for protecting a
defendant's fifth amendment privileges against self-incrimina-
tion.2 2 However, a confession can be considered involuntary in
16. Id.
17. Id. Pursuant to section 27-20-34 of the North Dakota Century Code, the
prosecution transferred the case from juvenile court to adult court. Id. Section 27-20-34
allows transfers from juvenile court when the child is fourteen years old or older and has
committed a "delinquent act involving the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm"
which would require the "child to be placed under legal restraint or discipline" in the
interest of the community. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 1989).
18. Elivanger, 453 N.W.2d at 812. The trial court had denied Brandon's motion to
suppress the statement. Id.
19. ElIvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 812. The judge made the statement while trying to clear
up the error of the trial court's reading the charging information. Id. at 815. Brandon
contended that this might have prejudiced the jury because it was an indication of guilt. Id.
20. Id. at 812, 816. The court thought the admission was a result of an ignorance of
rights or possibly an admission from Brandon's " 'fantasy, fright or despair.' " Id. at 815
(quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967)). The court thought the reading of the charging
information did not result in an unfair trial, even though it was not a perfect one. Id. at 815.
The court did not address the effect of the judge's statement, due to the reversal on other
grounds. Id. at 816.
21. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-45 (1966). The Miranda Court reviewed
four cases in which the defendants were interrogated without being informed of their
rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Id. All four
defendants had made incriminating oral admissions. Id. at 445. The Court held that a
prosecutor cannot use statements obtained from a defendant if that defendant was not
given safeguards against self-incrimination. Id. at 444. The Court required the following
safeguards, or their equivalent:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the
individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not
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some circumstances and therefore inadmissible, even if the warn-
ing requirements set forth in Miranda are satisfied. 3
One year after Miranda, the Supreme Court decided In re
Gault,24 in which the Court recognized procedural due process
rights for minors.2' Two of the due process rights recognized for
juveniles were the right to counsel 26 and the privilege against self-
incrimination.27 The In re Gault decision indicates that the juve-
nile court is not excluded from the requirements of constitutional
protections.2 8 Previously, the Court had only narrowly addressed
the issue, without coming to this broad conclusion.29
Before In re Gault, the juvenile court followed the doctrine
of parens patriae, which meant that the juvenile court was much
like a guardian and was, therefore, allowed much discretion in
dealing with minors.3 ° Juvenile proceedings were based on an
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he
has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
Id. at 444-45. The Court summarized the requirement by stating that the defendant has
the right "'"to remain silent'" and that any statement must be made in the "'unfettered
exercise of his own will.' ' Id. at 460 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
23. Id. at 494-97. When the Court was discussing the case of one of the defendants
(Westover v. United States, No. 761), they found that even though the FBI had given
warnings prior to their interview, the confession was deemed involuntary because the
defendant had previously been interrogated by local police for fourteen continuous hours
before the FBI interview. Id. at 495-96. The Court felt this was similar to informing the
defendant of his constitutional rights at the end of the interview, as opposed to the
beginning. Id. at 496.
24. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
25. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). The Supreme Court was reviewing a holding in
which a fifteen-year-old was declared a delinquent by the juvenile court without his parents
receiving adequate notice of the delinquency hearing. Id. at 34. This was held to be a
violation of defendant's due process rights. Id. at 33-34.
26. Id. at 41.
27. Id. at 49-50. The Court stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone." Id. at 33.
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47. The Court broadly stated, in its discussion of waiver
against self-incrimination, that "fi]t would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children. The language of
the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privilege is
comprehensive." Id. at 47.
29. See e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (In Kent, a sixteen-year-old
raped and robbed a woman. Id. at 543. The juvenile court waived its jurisdiction, thereby
subjecting the defendant to adult court without providing a hearing or specifying any
findings. Id. at 546. The Court held that some sort of due process is required, even though
it need not be the same as the due process given to adults. Id. at 562.); Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596 (1948) (In Haley, a fifteen-year-old was arrested for acting as a lookout in a robbery
and murder at a store. Id. at 597. The minor was allegedly beaten and later questioned for
five hours before confessing, without being informed of his rights. ld. at 597-99. The Court
stated that the fourteenth amendment forbids confessions from being forced out of either
an adult or child. Id. at 601.); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (The Court
recognized, as it had in Haley, that a minor is entitled to some sort of constitutional rights.).
30. Holtz, Miranda in a juvenile Setting: A Child's Right to Silence, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 534, 535 (1987). A child involved in crimes was not considered to be a
criminal who was adverse to society, but was instead a person needing "understanding,
guidance and protection." Id. at 535. The juvenile court decided how to react in order to
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assumption that the juvenile court does not determine whether
the minor is a criminal, but whether the child is in need of treat-
ment, reformation, or rehabilitation.3 ' In re Gault indicates that
the juvenile court is truly a court of law as opposed to a mere civil
service for the prevention of delinquency.3 2
Though it seems clear that a minor can waive his constitu-
tional rights, 3 3 the waiver must be made "knowingly and volunta-
rily."' 34 There are important questions as to what circumstances
are required for a minor to adequately waive the right to counsel
and the privilege against self-incrimination. 5 These questions are
especially important because findings suggest that minors nor-
mally do not fully understand or utilize their constitutional
rights.36 Two main approaches have evolved for determining the
further the best interest of the minor, while at the same time considering the interests of
the community. Id. See also Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary
Requirements and Reappraisal, 53 VA. L. REV. 1700, 1709-10 (1967) (discussing whether
the interests of society and the juvenile can be reconciled).
31. Comment, Interrogation ofluveniles: The Right to a Parent's Presence, 77 DICK. L.
REV. 543, 546-47 (1973). The juvenile court was considereed to be in a paternalistic
position with the intention of protecting the child from the trauma involved in the criminal
process. Id. at 547. See Holtz, supra note 30, at 535 (the atmosphere in the juvenile court
was considered to be more like a therapeutic/counseling session than an adversarial adult
trial).
32. See Ketcham, supra note 30, at 1700-01. Ketcham felt that Gault was a decision
that called for a re-evaluation of the juvenile courts' function in society and thought that
these courts ought to be renovated to establish a new role. Id. at 1700. Ketcham wanted,
however, to clarify that the applicability of the rights discussed in Gault were limited to
situations in which the juvenile proceeding (1) might result in a determination of
delinquency based on the alleged conduct, and (2) is a decision which could result in the
curtailment of the juvenile's freedom. Id. at 1706-07. Ketcham felt that Gault stood for the
proposition that since children are involved in increasingly serious crimes leading to serious
penalties, they are also entitled to due process and fair treatment. Id. at 1707.
33. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (In analyzing whether the juvenile
waived his Miranda rights, the Court used the same approach as used for adults.).
34. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (discussing the requirements of whether a waiver was made "voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently"). The "knowingly and intelligently" elements are satisfied
when a defendant is informed of his rights and the consequences of foregoing the rights and
then makes an intelligent decision based on the understanding of these rights. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 467-68. The determination of whether the defendant is aware of the privileges
is based on all the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 468-69. A "voluntary" admission is
made without either physical or psychological coercion. Id. at 464-65. The psychological
coercion was explained by the Court in Miranda through a discussion of various tactics used
by the police to obtain confessions which, at that time, were in police manuals and texts. Id.
at 446-56. The Court noted that one of the most effective means of psychological coercion
is to isolate the individual from everyone but the interrogators. Id. at 449.
35. See Note, Waiver in the Juvenile Court, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1149, 1156-64 (1968)
(discussing minors' ability to waive right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination). See also Note, Waiver of Constitutional Rights by Minors: A Question of
Law or Fact?, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 223, 225-26 (1967) (discussing minors' incompetence at
making an effective waiver).
36. Comment, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1975, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 558, 705
(1976). See Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 53-
54 (1970). The study done by Ferguson and Douglas showed that most minors could not
waive their constitutional rights knowingly and intelligently. Id. This study showed that
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effectiveness of a waiver by a minor; namely, the totality approach
and the "per se" approach.
Under the totality approach, the determination of whether a
confession is voluntary is made by inquiring into the "totality of
the circumstances.- 38 Under this test, all of the surrounding cir-
cumstances will be considered by the court before finding a
waiver.39 The totality approach is based on the Supreme Court's
holding in Haley v. Ohio40 and has been formally adopted by most
courts.41 In Haley, the Court found that the defendant's confes-
sion was involuntary based on a combination of various factors,
such as the defendant's age, the duration and the timing of the
questioning, the "callous attitude of the police," and the juvenile's
lack of adult advice. 42
Later, in Fare v. Michael C.,43 the Supreme Court formally
adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test for determining
whether juveniles voluntarily waive their rights during interroga-
tion.44 Though there are factors that apply to all persons being
eighty-six out of ninety juveniles waived their rights, while only five out of the eighty-six
fully understood their rights. Id.
37. See Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1134-44 (1980) (discussing the pros and cons of the "totality"
approach and the "per se" approach).
38. Grisso, supra note 37, at 1138-40.
39. Id. at 1135. According to Grisso, the underlying theory of the "totality of the
circumstances" test, in the context of juvenile law, is that it is possible for children to
understand their constitutional rights. Id. at 1138. There are no distinct requirements
under this test; therefore, the court has almost total discretion. Id. at 1138-39. Basically,
under this test, the court considers all the surrounding circumstances in determining
whether the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 1138.
40. 332 U.S. 596 (1948). For the facts of the case, see supra note 29.
41. Note, Waiver of Miranda Rights by Juveniles: Is Parental Presence a Necessary
Safeguard?, 21 J. FAM. L. 725, 730 (1982-83) (discussing whether a parent need be present
to advise the minor when the minor is waiving a right).
42. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948). The Court noted that although a
mature man might have withstood the treatment by the police, a fifteen-year-old would be
overwhelmed by such treatment. Id. at 599-600. The Court felt that without someone to
counsel the minor, the admission may have been made out of fear or panic, rather than
through a voluntary decision. Id. at 599-600. The Court held that the confession was not
truly voluntary and should not have been admitted at trial. Id. at 601. The murder
conviction was therefore reversed. Id.
43. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
44. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). In Fare, a sixteen-year-old was
arrested on suspicion of murder. Id. at 710. When he requested to see his probation officer,
the request was denied, and he proceeded to implicate himself in the murder. Id. at 710-
11. The Court stated that "[t]he totality approach permits--indeed, it mandates--inquiry
into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." Id. at 725. The Court referred
to various elements enumerated in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), including
an evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.
Fare, 442 U.S. at 725. The Court also stated that the inquiry needs to ascertain whether the
juvenile "has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." Id.
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interrogated, 45 there is a special focus when the confessor is a juve-
nile.46 Furthermore, the Court has stated that it requires that
great care be taken when a confession is made by a juvenile with-
out the presence of counsel.4 7 The prosecution is required to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was
voluntary.48
The "per se" approach for determining the effectiveness of a
waiver is an extension of the totality approach. Under the "per se"
approach, not only must the waiver of constitutional rights be
shown to be voluntary in light of all of the surrounding circum-
stances, the waiver must also be excluded if certain procedural
safeguards are not followed. 49 Though the "per se" rule has never
been explicitly required by the Supreme Court to fulfill due pro-
cess rights, dictum in Gallegos v. Colorado50 suggested the useful-
ness, or possible necessity, of some sort of adult advice when a
minor is asked to waive a constitutional right.5 ' Regardless of the
Gallegos dictum, the "per se" rule is the minority position. 2
In State v. Ellvanger,3 the North Dakota Supreme Court
examined whether the admissions made by Brandon Ellvanger in
the course of the police investigation of the incident were admissi-
45. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Bustamonte, the Court
listed the factors used in assessing the "totality of circumstances":
the youth of the accused; his lack of education; his low intelligence; the lack of
any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; the length of the detention;
the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical
punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. In all of these cases, the
Court determined the factual circumstances surrounding the confession,
assessed the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal
significance of how the accused reacted.
Id. at 226 (citations and footnotes omitted). The Court also noted its support for a "careful
scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances." Id.
46. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725.
47. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). In determining whether the confession is
voluntary, the inquiry is not only whether it was "coerced or suggested, but also that it was
not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." Id.
48. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986). The Court held that the higher
burden of proof would not be justified in light of the public interest in getting probative
evidence into the trial for the purpose of resolving the case correctly. Id.
49. Grisso, supra note 37, at 1135. Under the "per se" approach, assistance by an
interested parent or guardian is required if the minor doesn't have counsel. Id. Waivers of
constitutional rights made without this assistance are invalid. Id.
50. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
51. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962). The Court stated that a "lawyer or an
adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the protection which his own
immaturity could not." Id. However, the Court did not use the "per se" approach; it
simply used the "totality of the circumstances" test in reaching its decision. Id. at 54-55.
See also Note, Due Process Reasons for Excluding Juvenile Court Confessions from Criminal
Trials, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 880, 902-09 (1962) (discussing Gallegos).
52. Grisso, supra note 37, at 1134. See also Comment, supra note 36, at 709 (discussing
Pennsylvania's use of the "per se" approach in requiring counsel or some other friendly
adult to be present before a juvenile can waive his or her rights).
53. 453 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1990).
532
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ble as evidence. 54 The court analyzed whether Brandon's admis-
sion of shooting the gun was voluntary under the "totality of the
circumstances. ' 55 The court's "totality of the circumstances" anal-
ysis included a determination of whether the statutory provisions
of section 26-20-26 of the North Dakota Century Code were
required and thereafter satisfied."
The court first noted that in order for an admission to be
admissible in a criminal trial, it must have been made volunta-
rily.57 In making the determination of whether the admission was
voluntary, the court considered all of the surrounding circum-
stances.5 The court then discussed a nonexhaustive list of factors
that should be considered when deciding whether a confession is
voluntary.59 The court also explained that the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test includes consideration of "the characteristics and
condition of the accused at the time of the confession, as well as
the details of the setting in which the confession was obtained
.... ,,60 The court stated that " 'the prosecution must show waiver
by at least a preponderance of the evidence.' "61 Furthermore,
the court held that the appropriate standard of review was to
determine whether the "voluntariness is manifestly against the
54. State v. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d 810, 812 (N.D. 1990).
55. Id. at 815.
56. Id. at 812-15.
57. Id. at 812 (citing State v. Rovang, 325 N.W.2d 276, 279 (N.D. 1982)). In Rovang, an
adult defendant confessed to a robbery after the alleged victim and some of the victim's
friends threatened to use force against him if he did not confess to the crime. Rovang, 325
N.W.2d at 278-79. The court held that the "confession must be voluntary in order to be
admissible into evidence at a criminal trial" and reversed the trial court's conviction. Id. at
279 (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 395-96 (1964)). In Denno, The United States
Supreme Court established that it was "practical and desirable" to require that "a proper
determination of voluntariness be made prior to the admission of the confession to the jury
which is adjudicating guilt or innocence." Denno, 378 U.S. at 395.
58. ElIvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 812. See also State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260, 264
(N.D. 1980) (court established the following two criteria for determining whether an
admission was made freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances: 1)
whether the decision to waive the right to remain silent was voluntarily made; and 2)
whether the confession itself was made voluntarily).
59. ElIvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 812. The court quoted Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 226 (1973), in presenting the following list: "'[T]he lack of any advice to the
accused of his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of
food or sleep.'" Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 812 (citations omitted). For the full list, see
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226.
60. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 812. See also State v. Pickar, 453 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1990)
(The defendant had confessed to driving a car in an accident which resulted in the death of
two of defendant's friends, and the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
decision to withhold the confession due to Pickar's emotional state, his physical injuries at
the time of the confession, and the police conduct). The Pickar court stated that a
confession is voluntary if it is a "product of the defendant's free choice, rather than a
product of coercion." Id. at 785.
61. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 812 (quoting State v. Newman, 409 N.W.2d 79, 83-84
(N.D. 1987) (citations omitted)).
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weight of the evidence. 62
The court recognized that this case presented a unique situa-
tion because Brandon was a juvenile and was challenging the vol-
untariness of the admission.63 The court reasoned that one of the
most important issues to examine when determining whether a
juvenile's admission was voluntary is whether the youth was able
to understand his rights and the consequences of waiving those
rights. 64 The court took special notice of that fact, since the admis-
sion was made by a juvenile without the help of counsel.6"
The court's first step in determining if Brandon's admission
was voluntary was to inquire whether Brandon had been ade-
quately protected under section 27-20-26 of the North Dakota
Century Code.66 Though the North Dakota Supreme Court has
stated that "27-20-26, N.D.C.C. does not preclude the possibility of
a waiver, by the child, of his right to counsel, '67 minors cannot
waive this right unless they are adequately represented by a par-
ent, guardian, or custodian.6 Section 27-20-26(1) of the North
62. Id. at 814. The court also noted that it gives "great deference" to the trial court's
holding. Id.
63. Id. at 813. The court cited to the discussion in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,725
(1979), in which the Supreme Court had listed special factors to be considered when
determining whether a juvenile's admission was voluntary. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 813
(citing Fare, 442 U.S. at 725). For a discussion on the elements of determining whether a
confession is voluntary, see supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
64. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 813.
65. Id. The court stated:
If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when [the] admission was
obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was
voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also
that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright
or despair.
Id. (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967)).
66. Id. Section 27-20-26(1) provides as follows:
1. Except as otherwise provided under this chapter, a party is entitled to
representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings under this
chapter and, if as a needy person he is unable to employ counsel, to have the
court provide counsel for him. If a party appears without counsel the court shall
ascertain whether he knows of his right thereto and to be provided with counsel
by the court if he is a needy person. The court may continue the proceeding to
enable a party to obtain counsel and shall provide counsel for an unrepresented
needy person upon his request. Counsel must be provided for a child not
represented by his parent, guardian, or custodian. If the interests of two or more
parties conflict separate counsel shall be provided for each of them.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26(1) (1974) (emphasis added).
67. In re D.S., 263 N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D. 1978).
68. See In re J.D.Z., 431 N.W.2d 272, 276 (N.D. 1988). J.D.Z., a minor, had summoned
the police to inform them of his knowledge of a vandalism. Id. at 273. When it became
apparent that J.D.Z. was lying, the investigation focused on him. Id. at 275. J.D.Z.
proceeded to confess to the crime upon the insistence of his stepfather (who was held not to
be looking out for J.D.Z.'s interests) and without the assistance of counsel. Id. at 273-74.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the confession was in violation of his
statutory rights and, therefore, was properly suppressed. Id. at 276.
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Dakota Century Code provides that "[c]ounsel must be provided
for a child not represented by his parent, guardian, or custo-
dian."69  The court followed an earlier decision, holding that the
word "must" imposes a mandatory requirement in clear and
unambiguous language.7" The court' found that these require-
ments assist the minor and protect the minor's interests, as was
intended by the North Dakota Legislature.7 '
The court stated further that under section 27-20-26(1) it is
necessary that the parent, guardian, or custodian represent the
best interests of the minor if counsel for the minor is not present.72
In a prior case, the court had stated that the "mere presence of a
parent does not constitute representation," and if the child is not
adequately represented by his parent, guardian, or custodian, the
state is required to provide the minor with legal counsel before
questioning.73 The Ellvanger court found that Brandon's grandfa-
ther was present at the time of the questioning but did nothing to
protect Brandon's interests. 74  Thus, the court held that there was
not a parent, guardian, custodian, or counsel present at the time of
the interview to safeguard Brandon's best interests.7 5
The court next discussed the fact that section 27-20-26 of the
North Dakota Century Code requires that counsel or representa-
tion by parent, guardian, or custodian needs to be present at all
stages of the proceedings against a juvenile.76  North Dakota
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26(1) (1974) (emphasis added). For the text of section 27-
20-26(1), see supra note 66. See also Note, supra note 41, at 743 (discussing the opinion that
parental presence best satisfies the safeguards required by Gault in regard to a waiver by a
minor).
70. State v. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d 810, 813 (N.D. 1990) (citing In re D.S., 263 N.W.2d
114, 120-21 (N.D. 1978)). The language used by the court in D.S. was that "[t]he wordImust' cannot be construed to impose or grant a merely directory or nonmandatory duty or
right unless the context within which it is used clearly indicates that such was the intent of
the Legislature." D.S., 263 N.W.2d at 119.
71. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 813. See State v. Grenz, 243 N.W.2d 375, 380 (N.D.
1976). In Grenz, the court stated that "it is apparent that the Legislature recognized the
necessity for an advocate on behalf of the child to be present to protect the interests of the
child in the often-adversary setting of juvenile court proceedings." Id.
72. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 815. See also In re J.D.Z., 431 N.W.2d 272, 275-76 (N.D.
1988) (in a hearing to determine whether J.D.Z. was a juvenile delinquent, the court found
that J.D.Z. had not been represented by a parent, guardian, or custodian; J.D.Z.'s stepfather
had asked questions that helped incriminate J.D.Z. and had simply told J.D.Z. to answer
them.)
73. In re J.D.Z., 431 N.W.2d 272, 276 (N.D. 1988).
74. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 814, 815. When the police began questioning Brandon,
his grandfather simply said, "'If you know anything about this, go ahead and tell him .......
Id. at 814.
75. Id. at 815.
76. Id. at 813. See N. D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26(1) (1974). Section 27-20-26(1)
provides, in relevant part, that "a party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all
stages of any proceedings under this chapter .... " For full text of section 27-20-26(1), see
supra note 66.
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courts have adopted what could be called a "focus" test to deter-
mine what are "stages of any proceeding."77 Under this test,
"stages of any proceeding" are not only events that occur in a
courtroom, but also include any "circumstances in which an officer
has focused his investigation on a particular suspect and is intent
on gathering evidence, not merely investigating a complaint."7"
The court stated that until the investigation focuses on a person,
there is no mandatory right to counsel under section 27-20-26 of
the North Dakota Century Code.79
Though the court found that Brandon had not been provided
with the protections required by section 27-20-26,80 it also stated
that the "'investigation must focus on the individual before the
right to counsel applies.' "81 Therefore, in determining whether
there was a violation of the section 27-20-26 of the North Dakota
Century Code, the question of when the investigation focused
upon Brandon was determinative.82 However, there was no find-
ing of fact by the trial court as to whether the investigation was
focusing on Brandon at the time of the questioning. 3 Through an
analysis of the record, the Elivanger court concluded that "it is
beyond dispute" that Brandon's statements made to the investiga-
tors after he was read his Miranda rights were made after the
investigation had focused on him.84 The court ruled that any
other statements that were made after the investigation had
focused on Brandon were also inadmissible, due to violations of
section 27-20-26.85
77. In re J.D.Z., 431 N.W.2d 272, 275 (N.D. 1988). J.D.Z., his mother, his stepfather
and a police officer sat down in J.D.Z.'s living room to discuss the vandalism that J.D.Z. said
he had witnessed. Id. at 273. The officer became suspicious that J.D.Z. was lying. Id. The
Supreme Court of North Dakota found that once the policeman became aware that J.D.Z.
might be involved in the vandalism, the investigation had focused on J.D.Z. and, therefore,
at that point in time, J.D.Z was entitled to the protections granted by section 27-20-21. Id.
at 276.
78. Id. at 275.
79. ElIvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 813. See In re M.D.J., 285 N.W.2d 558, 559-62 (N.D.
1979). In MD., a policeman was called to help some people who were shot. Id. at 559.
When the policeman asked M.D.J. (a minor) where his parents were, M.D.J. said, "'They
are upstairs'" and "'I shot them."' Id. at 560. The North Dakota Supreme Court found
that this was not an investigation of M.D.J. under section 27-20-06 of the North Dakota
Century Code, since the investigation was not focused on M.D.J. at the time. Id. at 562.
The court, therefore, allowed M.D.J.'s statements to be admitted as evidence. Id. at 565-66.
80. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 815. Because Brandon had not been provided with
counsel, and since "Brandon was not represented by a parent, guardian, or custodian
during his interrogation... Brandon was denied his right to counsel under [section] 27-20-
26." Id.
81. ld. at 813 (quoting In re M.D.J., 285 N.W.2d 558, 562 (N.D. 1979)).
82. Id. at 814-15.
83. Id. at 814.
84. Id. at 814-15.
85. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 814-15.
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Based on the conflicting testimony in the record, the court
was unable to determine whether the initial questions directed at
Brandon occurred before or after Brandon had become the focus
of the investigation.86  Therefore, the court reversed and
remanded the trial court's decision for a determination of whether
Brandon was the focus of the police officer's investigation at the
time he had first made the incriminating statements.
87
If there is a violation of section 27-20-26 of the North Dakota
Century Code, any confession will be in violation of statutory
rights and will therefore be inadmissible.88 Nevertheless, because
it could be found on remand that the investigation had not focused
on Brandon during the initial questioning, the court proceeded to
make a determination as to whether the waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination was voluntary.89
The court began this determination by inquiring into the
"totality of the circumstances."9 The court found that Brandon's
admissions made after Halverson's initial question were "the prod-
uct of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or
despair." 9' The court did not determine whether Brandon's initial
statement was voluntary.92
The fairness of the trial was also challenged because of a viola-
86. Id. at 816. There were conflicting stories by Floyd Ellvasiger, Brandon's
grandfather, and the Mountrail County Sheriff, Kenneth Halverson. Id. at 814. Floyd had
testified that he had told Halverson prior to the time Halverson questioned Brandon that
Brandon had shot Gregory, which would mean the investigation had focused on Brandon.
Id. Halverson contended, however, that he was not initially focusing upon Brandon, but
was questioning Brandon simply because he was the only one around. Id. Halverson
argued that only after Brandon had made the statement that "'I only shot to scare them,'"
did Halverson read Brandon his Miranda rights and focus on Brandon. Id.
87. Id. at 816.
88. Id. at 813. Section 27-20-27(2) of the North Dakota Century Code provides, in
relevant part, that "[a]n extra-judicial statement, if obtained in the course of violation of this
chapter or which would be constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, shall not
be used against [the defendant]." N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-27(2) (1974).
89. ElIvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 814-15. For an example of language indicating an
involuntary confession, see State v. Rovang, 325 N.W.2d 276, 279 (N.D. 1982). See also
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385 (1964) ("the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of
involuntary confessions").
90. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 815. See also Grisso, supra note 37, at 1138-40
(discussing the totality approach). For a comprehensive discussion of the "totality of the
circumstances" test, see supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
91. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 815 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967)). The
court noted several important factors in making this decision: Brandon was intoxicated
with at least a .21 percent blood alcohol concentration; it was questionable whether
Brandon received his Miranda rights; Brandon was repeatedly interrogated; Brandon had
little sleep; Brandon was in shock; and Brandon was not represented by counsel, parent,
guardian or custodian. Id. at 815. The court then held that "the trial court erred in
denying [Brandon's] motion to suppress" and therefore reversed the conviction. Id.
92. Id. Apparently, a determination of whether or not Brandon's initial statement was
voluntary would be made on remand after determining when the investigation focused on
Brandon. See id.
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tion of section 29-21-01(1) of the North Dakota Century Code,
which requires that the clerk or state's attorney, and not the trial
court, read the charging information.9 3 The court found that. this
violation, alone, did not constitute reversible error, because it did
not cause an unfair trial for Brandon.94
Finally, Brandon claimed that the trial court judge may have
created an inference of guilt when he stated that he would "end
up sentencing" Brandon.' 5 Though this could possibly have
amounted to reversible error, 6 the court did not address the issue
further because of the reversal on other grounds.97
The North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Elivanger
strongly reinforces the interpretation of section 27-20-26 of the
North Dakota Century Code as a recognition by the North Dakota
Legislature of the necessity for a minor to have an adult advocate
present who will protect the interests of the minor.98 The enact-
93. Id. At trial, the judge had read the charging information. Id. Section 29-21-01(1)
of the North Dakota Century Code provides: "If the information or indictment is for a
felony, the clerk or state's attorney must read it, and must state the plea of the defendant to
the jury. In all other cases this formality may be dispensed with." N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-
21-01(1) (1974).
94. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 815. See also State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154 (N.D. 1975).
In Allen, the court explained:
As an appellate court, we disregard error which does not affect substantial rights
(harmless error), while we must consider errors objected to at trial that were
prejudicial (reversible error) and errors 'so fundamental that a new trial or other
relief must be granted even though the action was not objected to at the time'
(obvious error).
Id. at 162 (quoting N.D.R. CraM. P. 52 commentary). The court said there must be a consid-
eration of the error with all of the evidence to determine whether substantial injury to the
person's rights had resulted. Id. The court further declared that "a defendant is entitled to
a fair trial, but not necessarily a perfect trial." Id. at 162.
95. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 815. The statements in question occurred when the trial
judge tried to correct the error of the court's reading of the charging information. Id. The
court stated to the jury:
'Incidentally, at the outset, well, when I gave you the preliminary instructions, I
read to you the Information. The mere fact that I did that doesn't mean to infer
that I feel one way or the other about the guilt or the innocence of this young
man of any of these charges--crimes charged. You folks are the trier of the facts.
That's your decision to make. I'll give you the law and I'll end up sentencing
him, but it's your job to decide that issue. Okay. Thank you.'
Id. at 815 (quoting trial judge).
96. Id. at 816. See also State v. Yodsnukis, 281 N.W.2d 255, 262 (N.D. 1979) (court
noted that jurors are often influenced by the judge's opinions, which may create a
prejudicial effect on the defendant).
97. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 816. See also Hospital Services v. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d 69,
71 (N.D. 1975) (court explained that questions do not need to be considered, when they do
not affect the determination of the case).
98. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 813. See In re D.S., 263 N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D. 1978) (the
court held that it is mandatory for children to have counsel during all stages of an
interrogation if they are not represented by a parent, guardian, or custodian). See also State
v. Grenz, 243 N.W.2d 375, 380 (1976) (where the court recognized the need of an adult
advocate to act on behalf of the minor in juvenile court proceedings). For the text of
section 27-20-26 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 66.
538
1991] CASE COMMENT 539
ment of section 27-20-26 appears to indicate that North Dakota
has adopted the "per se" approach in regard to minors' ability to
waive their constitutional and statutory rights.99
In Ellvanger, the court established that the right for a minor
to have an adult present is absolute, and transfer from juvenile
court to the adult court will not eliminate the protections provided
by the Code.100 It appears that in North Dakota there is simply a
mandate that any questioning that may incriminate a minor
requires adult guidance as set forth in section 27-20-26 of the
North Dakota Century Code. 10 Therefore, any admission made
by a minor will be inadmissible as evidence if any of the proce-
dural safeguards provided by the statute are not followed.
10 2
Even if the statutory safeguards are followed, courts in North
Dakota will carefully scrutinize all of the surrounding circum-
stances to determine whether the waiver was voluntary.1
0 3
Ellvanger makes it clear that factors which are inherent in youth
will be weighed heavily in this determination.' 0 4 Therefore, every
precaution should be taken when interrogating a minor.
Ronald J Knoll
99. For a discussion of the "per se" approach, see notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
100. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 813. The court stated that the transfer under section
27-20-34 of the North Dakota Century Code is only a termination of jurisdiction, not a
process to "retroactively revoke any other right." Id.
101. The relevant text states that "[clounsel must be provided for a child not
represented by his parent, guardian, or custodian." N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (1974).
102. See generally Grisso, supra note 37, at 1135 ("per se " approach requires exclusion
of a waiver without minor being provided with the required safeguards). Section 27-20-
27(2) of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
A child charged with a delinquent act need not be a witness against or otherwise
incriminate himself. An extra-judicial statement, if obtained in the course of
violation of this chapter or which would be constitutionally inadmissible in a
criminal proceeding, shall not be used against him.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-27(2) (1974).
103. For a discussion on the "totality of the circumstances" test, see supra notes 38-48
and accompanying text.
104. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d at 813. The court focused on age, experience,
intelligence, education, background, and, especially, ability to understand. Id. (citing Fare
v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).

